\section{Overcoming the Barriers}
\label{sec:overcomingbarriers}

Until now we have showed that there are indeed barriers to a transition of the current Internet architecture to an ICN architecture. By means of our theoretical framework and our primary data, we have been able to outline the barriers to such a transition and discuss their characteristics. Now we will discuss to which extend we are able to say anything about the second sub-question: \textit{What can be done in order to overcome the barriers to a transition}. \bigskip

\noindent In sub-section \ref{subsec:dissum} we summarized the barriers to a transition to ICN. Our reflections regarding our second sub-question are arranged in such manner that we can cover all the various relevant topics.

\subsection{Alignment of Institutions}
\label{subsec:alignmentinstitutions}
In subsection \ref{subsec:institutionaldesign} we depicted that the current circumstances disallows a proper institutional design that can support an ICN transition. Is seems very relevant for us to assess whether we are at all able to propose ways to enable proper institutional design. As described in the resarch philosophy, section \ref{sec:considerations}, we have gone through a learning process, where we have re-biased, got wiser, and arrived at a new standpoint. Our hope was that we in the end should be able to come up with suggestions for overcoming the barriers. This is what we are going to discuss now from an institutional design perspective. \bigskip

\noindent We found out that a more proper institutional design, which helps in coordinating and establishing pressure on the existing regime, can be constructed by ensuring more hierarchical governance structures within the Internet regime. This will increase the momentum of ICN as a niche-innovation by means of collective actions. But that brings us to the recursive question of what are the barriers to an establishment of more hierarchy on the Internet? Obviously that also goes directly against the initial non-governed, non-proprietary structure of the Internet, and so we argue that hierarchy is not a considerable way to overcome the barriers to transition. Still, if one sees the whole Internet as a public good, it might be reasonable to compare it to the control of other public goods such as drinking water and traffic infrastructure. As engineering students we are definitely not able to come up with specific suggestions of how to establish a pure hierarchical governance structure of the Internet as such - and if it even makes sense to consider - but our research supports the idea of having a 'sheriff' in Cybertown\footnote{Conclusions of the 2004 WSIS meeting, also presented in sub-section \ref{subsec:multiplat} by \cite{JOHNSON}}, who can control an ICN deployment trajectory. \bigskip

\noindent A creation of a proper institutional design also requires incentives for the existing regime actors to participate in refining and pushing the niche-innova{\-}tion towards the regime. The existing regime-level institutional behaviours arguably act as stabilizers in the current Internet regime, thus the actors need some business incentives for destabilizing it in order to make room for ICN. Thereby we can conclude that more research regarding generation of economic value with ICN has to be conducted. \cite{PHAM} are apparently the only ones who have published concrete work about creation of economic value with ICN in the current socio-technical regime. \bigskip

\noindent This leads us to the discussion of how to bring down the collective switching costs.

\subsection{Collective Switching Costs}
We have shown that one of the main barriers to a transition to ICN is its level of maturity - it does not sufficiently cover the five attributes required for innovation adoption \citep{ROGERS}. One easy proposal for overcoming the barriers to a transition is thus to make more research in the field of ICT. Again, if there was a proper model for generating economic value with ICN, arguably the costs of switching would decrease. \bigskip

\noindent We have come to realize that there are two additional aspects of lowering the potential switching costs; by lowering the transaction costs and by controlling opportunism, which we go through next.

\subsubsection{Lowering Transaction Costs}

We have argued that uncertainties of future transaction costs might be a discouraging factor for the market to collectively create a new industry institution. Why should actors in the existing regime be first-movers and destabilize it? That would possibly increase the amount of transaction costs in interconnection and interfacing between two different paradigms. From this we argue that there have to be more solid interconnection mechanisms for the existing regime actors to consider a migration to ICN. Again, we can refer to \cite{PHAM}, who has made a pricing model for ICN interconnections instead of existing CDN interconnections. \bigskip

\noindent Market players act opportunistically \citep{WILLIAMSON} and that inherently increases transaction costs. Here we can relate to sub-section \ref{subsec:alignmentinstitutions} and say that proper institutional design also will bring down transaction costs and create incentives for regime actors to participate in the institution and adopt the technology.

\subsection{Enabling a Transition Pathway}

In sub-section \ref{transitionpathways} we have induced that one barrier for following a transformation pathway is the lack of evidence for the the capabilities of ICN to be a solution to negative externalities. Simply, external actors cannot exert enough pressure on the existing regime. To decrease the knowledge gap between external actors and regime actors ICN research has to produce evidence for its capabilities. \bigskip

\noindent Obviously, a reconfiguration pathway, where ICN functions as a component replacement for CDN is the most apparent way into the existing regime. Once again we can say that a lack of business incentives is the underlying barrier for the pathway because regime adoption has to be driven by economic considerations.

\subsection{Reproduction Processes of the Internet}

Until now we have showed that there are many hurdles for ICN to transit into the existing regime. Additionally, one can argue that the current regime encapsulates mechanisms for reproducing itself according to actor demands and by that is dynamically stable. This leaves very little room for ICN to break through the barriers into the regime. Without being Internet protocol it seems relevant to relate to the transition from IPv4 to IPv6. That is an example of the self-patching capabilities of the current socio-technical regime. \bigskip

\noindent One can discuss if the emergence of CDNs (which was a result of a necessity to move content closer to the users) actually can be seen as a former niche-innovation (by introducing a new technique for content distribution) that suddenly was adopted by the former regime because of instabilities, its inability to reproduce itself, and the appearance of economic business incentives for its utilization. We can draw an analogy; our research has showed that instabilities in the existing regime exist, and for ICN to follow the same pathway as CDNs, business incentives has to emerge. That will possibly put enough pressure on the regime for ICN to go through a transition.


\subsection{Creation of Business Incentives}

From various theoretical perspectives we have come to the conclusion that intensified generation of business incentives for deploying ICN is a way to overcome the barriers to a transition to ICN. \bigskip

\noindent Apparently there is not done so much research in the economic field of ICN. That is probably due to the current maturity-level of ICN. The maturity-level of ICN can be increased by creating proper business incentives, which probably will encourage major actors to invest in the technology and adapt it, and thus vice versa.